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Abstract
This paper addresses the following general problem of tree regular model-
checking: decide whether R∗(L) ∩ Lp = ∅ where R∗ is the reflexive and transitive
closure of a successor relation induced by a term rewriting system R, and L and
Lp are both regular tree languages. We develop an automatic approximation-based
technique to handle this – undecidable in general – problem in most practical cases,
extending a recent work by Feuillade, Genet and Viet Triem Tong. We also make
this approach fully automatic for practical validation of security protocols.
Key-words: Verification, model-checking, regular languages, security protocols.
Computing Reviews Categories: D.2.4 and F.4.2.
1 Introduction
Automatic verification of software systems is one of the most challenging research
problems in computer aided verification. In this context, regular model-checking has
∗This author was at IRISA-LANDES, Rennes, France when performing the work.
†This work was done while this author was at LIFC, INRIA-CASSIS, Besançon, France
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been proposed as a general framework for analysing and verifying infinite state sys-
tems. In this framework, systems are modelled using regular representations: the sys-
tems configurations are modelled by finite words or trees (of unbounded size) and the
dynamic behaviour of systems is modelled either by a transducer or a (term) rewriting
system. Afterwards, a system reachability-based analysis is reduced to the regular lan-
guages closure computation under (term) rewriting systems: given a regular language
L, a relation R induced by a (term) rewriting system and a regular set LP of bad config-
urations, the problem is to decide whether R∗(L)∩Lp = ∅ where R∗ is the reflexive and
transitive closure of R. Since R∗(L) is in general neither regular nor decidable, several
approaches handle restricted cases of this problem.
In this paper we address this problem for tree regular languages by automatically
computing over- and under-approximations ofR∗(L). Computing an over-approximation
Kover ofR∗(L) may be useful for the problem if Kover∩Lp = ∅, proving thatR∗(L)∩Lp =
∅. Dually, under-approximation may be suitable to prove that R∗(L) ∩ Lp , ∅. This
approach is relevant if the computed approximations are not too coarse. Another im-
portant point is that in general, there are some restrictions on the rewriting systems in
order to ensure the soundness of the above approach. This paper 1) generalises this
approach for any kind of term rewriting systems, and 2) describes its successful appli-
cation for the security protocol analysis.
1.1 Contributions
This paper extends an expert-human guided approximation technique introduced in [FGVTT04]
for left-linear term-rewriting systems. The contributions of this paper are:
1. We show how to extend the over-approximation approach of [FGVTT04] to all
term rewriting systems,
2. We show how the under-approximation approach of [FGVTT04] may be ex-
tended to a suitable sub-class of non-left-linear term-rewriting systems,
3. We explain how 1. can be efficiently implemented, particularly for quadratic
rewriting rules that are very useful in practice.
4. We explain how to make the approach fully automatic and how to successfully
exploit this approach in the context of security protocols verification.
Notice that 1. and 2. were respectively presented in [BHK06] and in [BHK07]
without proofs nor explicit examples.
1.2 Related Works
Model checking is a central verification technique based on state exploration. Since for
infinite state systems an exhaustive exploration is impossible, several symbolic tech-
niques (consisting in representing infinite sets of states by a symbolic finite represen-
tation) have been developed.
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1.2.1 Regular Model Checking
Regular Model Checking (RMC for short) is a symbolic approach using finite au-
tomata [ABJ98] [BW98] [BG96] [PS00] [JN00] [DLS02] (and sometimes regular ex-
pressions [BMT07]) in order to encode infinite sets of states. Most of these works deal
with word automata (see [FL02] for automata with Presuburger constraints, [BFL04]
for automata with counters, [FWW97] for pushdown automata, etc). These techniques
have been successfully used for verifying parametrized tree networks and data-flow
analysis of multithreaded programs [BT02], for lossy communicating system mod-
elling and verification [AAB99] [CF05] or for static analysis of programs [BET03]
[LJ07].
Tree data structures are more complex objects, and adapting or developing new
techniques remains a deep challenge. In [BT02], given a tree transducer T , the au-
thors explore how to use acceleration techniques to compute, under several hypothe-
ses, the transducer T ∗. In [BET05], the authors investigate how to use constraint sys-
tems in order to address the reachability problem for thread-based programs. The
work [BHRV06] extends the abstract regular model-checking technique from words
to trees. In this work reachability sets are over-approximated using a predicate abstrac-
tion. When computing reachability sets, involved automata cope with a combinatorial
state-space blow up; there are works to reduce these automata using simulation-based
state-space partitions. The work in [ALdR06] follows this approach and develops it for
tree automata.
1.2.2 Term Rewriting Systems and Reachability Analysis on Regular Languages
Given a term rewriting system R and two ground terms s and t, deciding whether
s →∗
R
t is a central question in automatic proof theory. This problem is shown decidable
for term rewriting systems which are terminating but it is undecidable in the general
case. Several syntactic classes of term rewriting systems have been pointed out to have
a decidable accessibility problem, for instance by providing an algorithm to compute
R∗(L) when L is a regular tree language [DT90] [CDGS91] [GT95] [Jac96] [RV02]
[Sal88].
In [FGVTT04], authors focus on a general completion based human-guided tech-
nique. This technique has been successfully used (not automatically) to prove the secu-
rity of cryptographic protocols [GK00] and recently Java Bytecode programs [BGJLR07].
This framework was extended in [OT05] to languages accepted by AC-tree automata.
1.2.3 Verification of Security Protocols
The challenge we want to take on is to automate [FGVTT04] for the security protocol
verification in a very general context. Cryptographic protocols are widely used to se-
cure information exchange over open modern networks. It is now widely accepted that
formal analysis can provide the level of assurance required by protocols both the de-
velopers and the users. But, whatever the used formal model, analysing cryptographic
protocols is a complex task because the set of configurations to consider is very large,
3
and can even be infinite. Indeed, any number of sessions (sequential or parallel execu-
tions) of protocols, sessions interleaving, any size of messages, algebraic properties of
encryption or data structures give rise to infinite-state systems. In the context of proto-
cols verification, the security problem we are dealing with consists in deciding whether
a protocol preserves secrecy against an intruder, or not.
Complexity Issues. For this problem, current model-checking based verification meth-
ods can be applied whenever the number of participants and the number of sessions
between the agents are bounded. In this case, the protocol security problem is co-NP-
complete [RT01]. The work in [Tru05] presents new decidability results for a bounded
number of sessions, restricted to the case where the initial knowledge of the intruder
is a regular language and under the assumption that the keys used in protocols are
atomic. When the number of sessions is unbounded, the security problem of cryp-
tographic protocols becomes undecidable, even when the length of the messages is
bounded [DLMS99] [DLMS04]. Decidability can be recovered by adding some re-
strictions to protocols as, for instance, in [CLC05]. Another way to circumvent the
problem is to employ abstraction-based approximation methods [Mon99][GK00].
Theoretical Works and Tools. A lot of theoretical work has been done for analysing
cryptographic protocols for different kinds of protocols and intruders models (wire-
less network [NH06], time-stamps [BEL05], combinations of theories [CR05], abelian
groups [LLT07], homomorphisms [CT03], isomorphisms [Del06], xor [CLS03] [CKRT05],
probabilistic encryption [DJ06], voting protocols [KR05] [NAN05], non-repudiation
protocols [AG02], Diffie-Hellman like protocols [GRV05], e-mail-certification [AB05],
etc), with different approaches (tree automata [OT05][KW04], SAT-solving [AC05],
model-checking [BMV03] ) and many tools (ProVerif [Bla01], Athena [Son99], AVISPA [ABB+05],
Hermes [BLP03], Murϕ [MMS97], ...) have been developed.
Close Works on Automated Protocol Analysis. An independent work close to our
approach is presented in [ZD06] where authors use a process algebra based model and
constraints-guided over-approximations. This approach has been successfully applied
to the complex Kerberos protocol. However, [ZD06] does not presently handle under-
approximations.
There already exists a number of tools in the literature that provide automated
semi-decision procedures for security protocols with an unbounded number of ses-
sions: Blanchet’s ProVerif, Ernie Cohen’s TAPS, Isabelle proof assistant for the Proto-
col Composition Logic (PCL) from Stanford.
The CL-AtSe tool (Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher) [CKRT05] now sup-
ports complete analysis of cryptographic protocols modulo the xor, including all the
intruder deduction rules for that operator, and modulo the exp except for the rule
g1 = g2 (i.e. exponentials are tagged). CL-AtSe analyses are performed for a bounded
number of sessions.
The On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC) [BMV03] tool-set, is based on two sym-
bolic techniques and now supports the specification of cryptographic operators alge-
braic properties, and typed or untyped protocol models, in the context of a bounded
number of sessions. sessions, [Möd07] develops an abstract interpretation based ap-
proach.
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The Proverif tool [Bla01] allows an unbounded number of sessions but – like in
our models – abstractions are performed on fresh data and thus false attacks can be
detected. Moreover, in [BAF08], the authors note that their technique does have limi-
tations, and in particular, it does not apply to some equational theories.
The recent Scyther tool [Cre06] can verify protocols with an unbounded number
of sessions and nonces. It can handle verification of complex authentication proper-
ties, handle non-atomic keys, and generate correct attacks. A performance comparison
between Scyther and a number of other tools has been detailed in [CL07]. Notice that
[CL07] reports on a set of protocols that excludes protocols using algebraic properties.
One of the new features of the Maude-NPA tool is that it allows to equationally
reason about security when facing attempted attacks on low-level algebraic properties
of the functions used in a protocol such as, for example, associativity-commutativity,
Boolean theory, and some forms of modular exponentiation [EMM07]. The Maude-
NPA tool follows an approach similar to that of OFMC since the authors consider
depth parameters for unification problems in some equational theories. However, the
Maude-NPA tool needs the help of expert users.
In the survey [CDL06], the authors emphasise the fact that the results often re-
main theoretical, and very few implementations automatically verify protocols with
algebraic properties.
1.3 Layout of the paper
Section 2 introduces notations and the basic completion approach. Next, Section 3
presents the main theoretical contributions of the paper. We introduce the notion of
(l → r)-substitutions in Section 3.1. We show how it can be used to develop an over-
approximation based technique for tree regular model-checking in Section 3.2. The
case of under-approximations is handled in Section 3.4, while Section 3.3 is dedicated
to an example. Section 4 exposes how the techniques are successfully exploited for
analysing security protocol.
2 Formal Background
As for prerequisites, the reader is expected to be familiar with basic notions on term
rewriting systems and tree automata. We just recall the terminology which is consistent
with [CDG+02], thus making our exposition as self-contained as possible.
2.1 Notations
Given the set N of natural integers, N∗ denotes the finite strings over N. Let F be a
finite set of symbols, associated with an arity function ar : F → N. The set of symbols
of F of arity i is denoted Fi. Let X be a countable set of variables. We assume that
X ∩ F = ∅. T (F ,X) denotes the set of terms, and T (F ) denotes the set of ground
terms (terms without variables).
A finite ordered tree t over a set of labels (F ,X) is a function from a prefix-closed
set Pos(t) ⊆ N∗ to F ∪X. A term t over F ∪X is a labelled tree whose domain Pos(t)
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satisfies the following properties: 1) Pos(t) is non-empty and prefix closed, 2) for each
p ∈ Pos(t), if t(p) ∈ Fn (with n , 0), then {i | p.i ∈ Pos(t)} = {1, . . . , n}, and 3) for each
p ∈ Pos(t), if t(p) ∈ X or t(p) ∈ F0, then {i | p.i ∈ Pos(t)} = ∅. The empty sequence ǫ
denotes the top-most position.
Each element of Pos(t) is called a position of t. For each subset K of F ∪ X and
each term t PosK (t) is the subset of positions p’s of t such that t(p) ∈ K . Each position
p of t such that t(p) ∈ F , is called a functional position.
A subterm t|p of t ∈ T (F ,X) at position p is defined by the following: Pos(t|p) =
{w ∈ N∗ | p.w ∈ Pos(t)}, and for all j ∈ Pos(t|p), t|p( j) = t(p. j). The term t[s]p is
obtained from t by replacing the subterm t|p by s. Var(t) is the set of variables occurring
within t and is formally defined as follows: Var(t) = {t(p) | p ∈ Pos(t) ∧ t(p) ∈ X}.
For all sets A and B, we denote by Σ(A, B) the set of functions from A to B. If
σ ∈ Σ(X, B), then for each term t ∈ T (F ,X), the term tσ is obtained from t by
replacing for each x ∈ X, the variable x by σ(x).
A term rewriting system (TRS for short) R over T (F ,X) is a finite set of pairs
(l, r) from T (F ,X) ×T (F ,X), written l → r, such that the set of variables occurring
in r is included in the set of variables of l. A TRS is left-linear if for each rule l → r,
every variable occurring in l occurs once at most. For each ground term t, we denote
by R({t}) the set of ground terms t′ such that there exist a rule l → r of R, a function
µ ∈ Σ(X,T (F )) and a position p of t satisfying t|p = lµ and t′ = t[rµ]p. The relation
{(t, t′) | t′ ∈ R({t})} is classically denoted →R. If t →R t′ for t, t′ ∈ T (F ), then t is a
rewriting predecessor of t′ and t′ is rewriting successor of t. For a set of ground terms
B, R∗(B) is the set of ground terms related to an element of B modulo the reflexive-
transitive closure of →R.
A tree automaton A is a tuple (Q,∆, F), where Q is the set of states, ∆ the tran-
sition set, and F the set of final states. Transitions are rewriting rules of the form
f (q1, . . . , qk) → qk+1, where f ∈ Fk and the qi’s are in Q. Such transitions are so
called normalised transitions. A term t ∈ T (F ) is accepted or recognised by A if there
exists q ∈ F such that t →∗
∆
q (we also write t →∗
A
q). The set of terms accepted
by A is denoted L(A). For each state q ∈ Q, we write L(A, q) for the tree language
L((Q,∆, {q})). A tree automaton is finite if its set of transitions is finite.
2.2 Completion
Given a tree automaton A and a TRS R, for several classes of automata and TRSs, the
tree automata completion algorithm computes a tree automaton Ak such that L(Ak) =
R∗(L(A)) when it is possible and such thatL(Ak) ⊇ R∗(L(A)) otherwise [GK00][FGVTT04].
The tree automata completion works as follows. From A = A0 the completion builds
a sequence A0,A1, . . . ,Ak of automata such that if s ∈ L(Ai) and s →R t then
t ∈ L(Ai+1). If the automaton Ak is a fixpoint, i.e. if Ak = Ak+1, then we have
L(Ak) ⊇ R∗(L(A)) (orL(Ak) = R∗(L(A0)) for some restrictive cases of [FGVTT04]).
To build Ai+1 from Ai, a completion step is performed which consists in finding criti-
cal pairs between →R and →Ai . For a substitution σ : X 7→ Q and a rule l → r ∈ R,
a critical pair is an instance lσ of l such that there exists q ∈ Q satisfying lσ →∗
Ai
q
and rσ 6→∗
Ai
q. For every critical pair lσ →∗
Ai
q and rσ 6→∗
Ai
q detected between R
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and Ai, Ai+1 is constructed by adding new transitions to Ai to recognise rσ in q, i.e.
rσ →Ai+1 q.
lσ
Ai
R
rσ
q
∗
Ai+1
∗
However, the transition rσ → q is not necessarily a normalised transition of the form
f (q1, . . . , qn) → q′ and so has to be normalised first. For example, to normalise a
transition of the form f (g(a), h(q′)) → q, we need to find some states q1, q2, q3 and
replace the previous transition by the following set of normalised transitions: {a →
q1, g(q1) → q2, h(q′) → q3, f (q2, q3) → q}.
Assume that q1, q2, q3 are new states, then adding the transition itself or its nor-
malised form does not make any difference. Now, assume that q1 = q2, the normalised
form becomes {a → q1, g(q1) → q1, h(q′) → q3, f (q1, q3) → q}. This set of nor-
malised transitions represents the regular set of non normalised transitions of the form
f (g∗(a), h(q′)) → q, which contains among many others the transition we initially
wanted to add. Hence, this is an over-approximation. We could have made an even
more drastic approximation by identifying q1, q2, q3 with q, for instance.
The above method does not work for all TRSs. For instance, consider a constant
A and the tree automaton A = ({q1, q2, q f }, {A → q1, A → q2, f (q1, q2) → q f }, {q f })
and the TRS R = { f (x, x) → g(x)}. There is no substitution σ such that lσ →∗
A
q,
for a q in {q1, q2, q f }. Thus, following the procedure, there is no transition to add. But
f (A, A) ∈ L(A). Thus g(A) ∈ R(L(A)). Since g(A) < L(A), the fixpoint automaton
obtained is not an over-approximation of R∗(L(A)).
This constraint may prevent someone from specifying a system, in particular con-
cerning protocols. Unfortunately, to be sound, the approximation-based analysis de-
scribed in [GK00] requires using of left-linear TRSs. Nevertheless, this method can
still be applied to some non left-linear TRSs, which satisfy some weaker conditions.
In [FGVTT04] the authors propose new linearity conditions. However, these new con-
ditions are not well-adapted to be automatically checked in the sense that, they are
verified as soon as the computation is over. And if these conditions are not satisfied
then the computation must be done again by changing some inputs of the approxima-
tion technique.
3 Main Results – Sound Completion for any Kind of
TRSs
The challenge of this section is to describe an alternative way for the technique [FGVTT04]
in order to make it sound for any kind of TRSs. We first introduce in Section 3.1
the notion of (l → r)-substitutions and the normalisation related to it. This kind of
substitution allows variables to store different values. Second, we present in Section
3.2 an extension of the completion procedure to any TRS for computing sound over-
approximations. This algorithm is then detailed on an example in Section 3.3. Third,
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Section 3.4 explores how the technique can be used in a restrictive case in order to
provide under-approximations for non left-linear TRSs. Fourth, Section 3.5 discusses
theoretical and practical aspects for applying the developed techniques to a large class
of applications.
3.1 (l → r)-substitutions, Normalisation
In this technical subsection, we define the notion of a (l → r)-substitution suitable for
the present work.
Definition 3.1 Let R be a term rewriting system and l → r ∈ R. A (l → r)-substitution
is an application from PosX(l) into Q.
Let l → r ∈ R and σ be a (l → r)-substitution. We denote by lσ the term of
T (F ,Q) defined as follows: Pos(lσ) = Pos(l), and for each p ∈ Pos(l), if p ∈ PosX(l)
then lσ(p) = σ(l(p)), otherwise lσ(p) = l(p). Similarly, rσ is the term in T (F ,Q) de-
fined by: Pos(rσ) = Pos(r), and for each p ∈ Pos(r), if p < PosX(r) then rσ(p) = r(p)
and rσ(p) = σ(l(p′)) otherwise, where p′ = min(Posr(p)(l)) (positions are lexicograph-
ically ordered). Let us note that the above choice (i.e. the minimal position for p′) is
arbitrary. Basically, every position in r where the considered variable occurs, may be
chosen. The heuristics to chose this position have not been investigated yet.
Example 3.1 Let us consider l = f (g(x), h(x, f (y, y))) and r = f (h(x, y), h(y, x)) repre-
sented by the following trees (elements after the comma are the positions in the term; l
is represented on the left and r on the right):
f , ε
g, 1 h, 2
x, 1.1 x, 2.1 f , 2.2
y, 2.2.1 y, 2.2.2
f , ε
h, 1 h, 2
x, 1.1 y, 1.2 y, 2.1 x, 2.2
Variable positions of l are 1.1 and 2.1 for x, and 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 for y. Let σ(1.1) =
q1, σ(2.1) = q2, σ(2.2.1) = q3 and σ(2.2.2) = q4; σ is a (l → r)-substitution and
lσ = f (g(q1), h(q2, f (q3, q4))) is the term obtained from l by substituting the variable
in position p by σ(p). Now we explain how to compute rσ. The minimal position where
x [resp. y] occurs in l is 1.1 [resp. 2.2.1]. Thus rσ is obtained from r by substituting all
x’s in r by σ(1.1) = q1 and all y’s by σ(2.2.1) = q3. Thus rσ = f (h(q1, q3), h(q3, q1)).
As mentioned before, the completion procedure does not work for all tree automata
and TRSs. That is why we introduce a notion of compatibility between finite tree-
automata and (l → r)-substitutions. The intuition behind the next definition is that
8
different occurrences of a variable may be substituted by different states if there exists
a term recognised by all these states, at least. Notice that the condition required below
is weaker than the conditions in [FGVTT04]. Moreover, it is more general and can be
applied to a larger class of applications.
Definition 3.2 Let A be a finite tree automaton. We say that a (l → r)-substitution σ
is A-compatible if for each x ∈ Var(l),
⋂
p∈Pos{x}(l)
L(A, σ(p)) , ∅.
Example 3.2 Let Aexe = ({q0, q f },∆exe, {q f }) with the set of transitions ∆exe = {A →
q0, A → q f , f (q f , q0) → q f , h(q0, q0) → q0}. Let Rexe be the TRS such that Rexe =
{ f (x, h(x, y)) → h(A, x)}. The automaton Aexe recognises the set of trees such that
every path from the root to a leaf is of the form f ∗h∗A. Let us consider the substitution
σexe defined by σexe(1) = q f , σexe(2.1) = q0 and σexe(2.2) = q0. The tree t = A
can be reduced to q f and belongs to L(A, σexe(1)). Furthermore t → q0, so t ∈
L(A, σexe(2.2)). Therefore σexe is A-compatible.
The notion of normalisation and approximation functions are close to the ones
given in [FGVTT04][BHK05]. Indeed, the definitions below are simply adapted to
our notion of (l → r)-substitutions.
Definition 3.3 Let A be a finite tree automaton. An approximation function (for A)
is a function which associates a function from Pos(r) to Q to each tuple (l → r, σ, q),
where l → r ∈ R, σ is an A-compatible (l → r)-substitution and q a state of A.
Example 3.3 Consider the automaton Aexe, the TRS Rexe and the substitution σexe
defined in Example 3.2. For σexe, an approximation function γexe may be defined by
γexe(l → r, σexe, q0) : {ε 7→ q1, 1 7→ q2, 2 7→ q f }
To totally define γexe, the others (finitely many) Aexe-compatible substitutions should
be considered too.
The notion of normalisation below is basic. The only difference comes from our
notion of (l → r)-substitutions.
Definition 3.4 Let A = (Q0,∆0, F0) be a finite tree automaton, γ an approximation
function forA, l → r ∈ R, σ an A-compatible (l → r)-substitution, and q a state of A.
We denote by Normγ(l → r, σ, q) the following set of transitions, called normalisation
of (l → r, σ, q):
{ f (q1, . . . , qk) → q′ |p ∈ PosF (r), r(p) = f ,
q′ = q if p = ε otherwise q′ = γ(l → r, σ, q)(p)
qi = γ(l → r, σ, q)(p.i) if p.i < PosX(r),
qi = σ(min{p′ ∈ PosX(l) | l(p′) = r(p.i)}) otherwise}
The min is computed for the lexicographic order.
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Notice that the set {p′ ∈ PosX(l) | l(p′) = r(p.i)} used in the above definition is not
empty as soon as Var(l) is not empty. Indeed, in a TRS, variables occurring in its right
hand-sides must, by definition, occur in the left-hand side too.
Example 3.4 Following Example 3.3, ε is the unique functional position of the term
r = h(A, y). We set q′ of the definition to be equal to q f . Thus Normγexe (l → r, σexe, q f )
is of the form {A → q?, h(q?, q??) → q f }. Since for r, the position 1 is a functional
position and 2 is in PosX(r), we use the last line of the definition to compute q??, and
q? is defined by the approximation function γexe. Finally, we obtain:
Normγexe (l → r, σexe, q f ) = {r(1) → γexe(1), r(ε)(γexe(1), σexe(1)) → q f }
= {A → q0, h(q0, q f ) → q f }.
Lemma 3.1 Let A be a finite tree automaton, γ an approximation function, l → r ∈
R, σ an A-compatible (l → r)-substitution, and q a state of A. If lσ →∗
A
q then
rσ →∗Normγ(l→r,σ,q) q.
The proof is obvious. The transitions in Normγ are precisely those added to reduce
rσ to q.
3.2 Over-Approximations for TRSs without Left-Linearity Con-
straint
This section is dedicated to the proof of the main result and explains how to build a reg-
ular over-approximation of R∗(A). The following definition presents the construction
of a tree automaton Cγ(A0) from the tree automaton A0, the approximation function γ
and the TRS R. This construction is usually named a completion step. Again, the only
considered substitutions are (l → r)-substitutions.
Definition 3.5 Let R be a TRS. Let A0 = (Q0,∆0, F0) be a finite tree automaton and
γ an approximation function for A0. The automaton Cγ(A0) = (Q1,∆1, F1) is defined
by:
∆1 = ∆0 ∪
⋃
Normγ(l → r, σ, q)
where the union involves all rules l → r ∈ R, all states q ∈ Q0, all A0-compatible
(l → r)-substitutions σ such that lσ →∗
A0
q and rσ 6→∗
A0
q,
F1 = F0 and Q1 = Q0 ∪ Q2,
whereQ2 denotes the set of states occurring in left or right-hand sides of ∆1 transitions.
The above lemma shows that a completion step computes an over-approximation
of terms obtained by one rewriting step.
Lemma 3.2 Let A0 = (Q0,∆0, F0) be a finite tree automaton and γ be an approxima-
tion function for A0. Let R be a TRS. One has L(A0) ∪ R(L(A0)) ⊆ L(Cγ(A0)).
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P. Let t ∈ L(A0) ∪ R(L(A0)). By definition of Cγ(A0) one has L(A0) ⊆
L(Cγ(A0)). Consequently, if t ∈ L(A0) then one has t ∈ L(Cγ(A0)). Thus we now
assume that t ∈ R(L(A0)). Thus there exists a rule l → r ∈ R, a term t0 in L(A0), a
position p of t0 and a substitution µ in Σ(X,T (F )) such that
t0|p = lµ and t = t0[rµ]p. (1)
t[]p = t0[]p
lµ
t0 : t[]p = t0[]p
rµ
t :
Since t0 ∈ L(A0), there exist a state q ∈ Q0 and a state q f ∈ F0 such that
lµ →∗A0 q and t0[q]p →∗A0 q f . (2)
Since lµ →∗
A0
q there exists an (l → r)-substitution σ such that lµ →∗
A0
lσ. Further-
more, for each x ∈ Var(l),
µ(x) ∈
⋂
p∈Pos{x}(l)
L(A, σ(p)),
thus the (l → r)-substitution σ is A0 compatible. Therefore, using Lemma 3.1 (by
hypothesis, lσ →∗
A0
q), one has
rσ →∗Cγ(A0) q. (3)
For each variable x occurring in l and all positions p of x in l, one has µ(x) →∗
A0
σ(p). In particular, for each variable x occurring in l, µ(x) →∗
A0
σ(p′), where p′ is the
minimal position where x occurs in l. Consequently and by definition of rσ, one has
rµ →∗A0 rσ. (4)
We are now able to conclude: using (1) one has t = t0[rµ]p. Now, by (4) t →∗A0
t0[rσ]p. To finish, using (3) and then (2) we obtain the following derivation: t →∗Cγ(A0)
t0[q]p →∗A0 q f . Thus t ∈ L(Cγ(A0)), proving the lemma. 
Let us remark that using well-chosen approximation functions may iteratively lead
to a fixpoint automaton which recognises an over-approximation of R∗(A0). One can
formally express this by the following (soundness) main theorem.
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Theorem 3.1 Let (An) and (γn) be respectively a sequence of finite tree automata and
a sequence of approximation functions defined by: for each integer n, γn is an approx-
imation function for An and An+1 = Cγn (An). If there exists a positive integer N, such
that for every n ≥ N, An = AN , then R∗(L(A0)) ⊆ L(AN).
The proof is by induction using Lemma 3.2.
3.3 Completion Example
In this section we explain how our approach works on an example in touch with the
mathematical world.
We consider terms defined over F0 = {0}, F1 = {Opp, s}, F2 = {+} and Fk≥3 = ∅.
Here, the symbol s denotes the successor function. For instance, s(s(s(0))) is the
successor of the successor of the successor of 0 and denotes the integer 3. The operator
Opp denotes the opposite value of an integer. For example, Opp(s(0)) is the opposite
value of the successor of 0 and denotes the integer −1. We use the following TRS to
encode addition and subtraction over Z. To simplify notations, we write (x+ y) or x+ y
for +(x, y).
R = {Opp(Opp(x)) → x (5)
x → Opp(Opp(x)) (6)
x + Opp(x) → 0 (7)
x + y → y + x (8)
x + (y + z) → (x + y) + z (9)
x + 0 → x (10)
x + s(0) → s(x) (11)
s(x) → x + s(0) (12)
Opp(s(x)) → Opp(s(s(x))) + s(0)} (13)
Notice that this TRS is not left-linear (Rule (7)). We are interested in the following
problem: given three integers a, b and c, are there integers λ and µ such that λa+µb = c?
A basic number theory result states that the answer to the previous question is yes if
and only if c is a multiple of the greatest common divisor of a and b.
For instance, it is possible for a = 7, b = 3 and c = 15 (since gcd(a, b) = 1). We
may prove it using the above TRS. Indeed, from s7(0) and s3(0) one can reach s15(0)
using +, Opp and rewriting rules. For example, s3(0) →∗12 s(0) + s(0)) + s(0). Conse-
quently, s3(0)+ s3(0) →∗(12),(9) s6(0). Similarly one has (((s7(0)+ s7(0))+ s7(0)) →∗(12),(9)
s21(0). Moreover, Opp(s3(0) + s3(0)) →∗(12),(9),(8) Opp(s21(0)) + s15(0). Therefore,
(((s7(0) + s7(0)) + s7(0)) + Opp(s3(0) + s3(0))
→∗(8),(12),(9) (s21(0) + Opp(s21(0))) + s15(0) →∗(7),(10) s15(0).
Now we prove that the problem has no solution for a = 2, b = 4 and c = 5 (this is
mathematically trivial, the goal is just to illustrate that it can be automatically proved
using our over-approximation approach).
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We consider for initial terms the language accepted by the following tree automaton
A whose states are q0, q1, q2, q3, q4, q−2 q−4 and q f , whose final states are q2,q−2, q−4,
q4, and q f , and whose transitions are 0 → q0, s(q0) → q1, s(q1) → q2, s(q2) → q3,
s(q3) → q4 (encodes that s2(0) and s4(0) are initially known), Opp(q4) → q−4 (encodes
that one can compute the opposite value of 4), Opp(q2) → q−2 (encodes that one can
compute the opposite value of 2), q f1 + q f2 → q f for all final states q f1 , q f2 , (encodes
that one can do the addition of two computed integers terms). We want to prove that
s5(0) < R∗(L(A)). Some details on the first completion step are given below.
Rule (5) This rule provides no new transition. Indeed, there is no state q in A such that
Opp(Opp(q)) can be reduced in A to a state.
Rule (6) For each state q one has to add the normalisation of the transition Opp( Opp(q))
→ q. Assume that
γ(Rule(6), {ε 7→ q1}, q1)(1) = q3.
Then during the completion step, the normalisation of Opp(Opp(q1)) → q1 adds
the transitions Opp(q1) → q3 and Opp(q3) → q1. With similar assumptions on
γ, one adds during the first completion step Opp(q0) → q0, Opp(q−4 → q4) and
Opp(q−2) → q2.
Rule (7) Since q4 +Opp(q4) →∗A q f , one has to add the transition 0 → q f (we may easily
verify this is the only compatible l → r-substitution).
Rule (8-11) These rules don’t provide new transitions.
Rule (12) Since s(q0) →A q1 and q0+ s(0) 6→∗A q1, one has to add the following transitions
(with correct assumptions on γ) 0 → q0, s(q0) → q1 (these two transitions are
already inA) and q0+q1 → q1. Similarly, one has to add transitions q0+q2 → q2,
q0 + q3 → q3, q0 + q4 → q4.
Rule (13) Since Opp(s(q1)) →∗A q−2 and Opp(s(s(q1)) + s(0)) 6→∗A q−2, one has to add the
transitions (with correct assumption on γ), s(0) → q1, s(q1) → q2, s(q2) → q3,
Opp(q3) → q1, q1 + q1 → q2 and Opp(q2) → q−2.
Similar completion steps lead to the following tree automaton B:
• States of B are q−4, q−2, q1, q2, q3, q4 and q f . Final states are q2, q4, q−2, q−4 and
q f , transitions on constants are 0 → q0 and 0 → q f .
• Transitions with symbol s are given by the following table:
q0 q1 q2 q3 q4
s q1 q2 q3 q4 q1
For instance, s(q2) → q3 is a transition.
• Transitions with symbols Opp and +are given by the following tables:
q−4 q−2 q0 q1 q2 q3 q4 q f
Opp q4 q2 q0 q3 q−2 q1 q−4 q f
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+ q−4 q−2 q0 q1 q2 q3 q4 q f
q−4 q−4, q f q−2, q f q−4 q1 q2, q f q3 q4, q f q f
q0
q−2 q−2, q f q0, q f q−2, q f q3 q0, q4, q f q1 q2, q f q f
q0 q−4, q f q−2, q f q0 q1 q2, q f q3 q4, q f ∅
q1 q1 q3 q1 q2, q f q3 q0, q f q f ∅
q4 ∅
q2 q2, q f q4, q f q2, q f q3 q f , q0 q1 q2, q f q f
q0 q4 q f
q3 q3 q1 q3 q4 q1 q2, q f q3 ∅
q4 ∅
q4 q0, q4 q2, q f q4, q0 q1 q2, q f q3 q4, q f q f
q f q f q0
q f q f q f ∅ ∅ q f ∅ q f q f
The automaton B is stable by the Cγ completion. Consequently, it accepts an over-
approximation of reachable terms of A by R. Since s5(0) < L(B), we may not have
λ.2 + µ.4 = 5 with λ, µ ∈ Z.
3.4 Under-Approximations for TRSs without Left-Linearity Con-
straint
The main idea (and problem) behind the under-approximations is that one wants the
languages of computed tree automata to be in the set of terms reachable by rewriting.
Having some conditions on the TRS allows us to prove that a term is actually reachable.
In order to obtain under-approximations, we do not want the completion procedure
to introduce unreachable terms. Classically, we then work with injective approximation
functions. We define here γ to be an injective approximation function from R × (N∗ 7→
Q) × N∗ × Q into Q. Theorem 3.2 shows that with such an approximation function,
an under-approximation of the set of reachable terms is possible. Before, Lemma 3.3
presents an intermediary result useful for proving Theorem 3.2: this result reveals some
features of terms recognised by Cγ(A) for which there exists a rewriting predecessor
recognised by A. In the following, we introduce the notation NLV(t) which for a
term t of T (F ,X), denotes the set of non-linear variables of t, i.e., the set of variables
occurring at least twice within t.
Lemma 3.3 Let R be a right-linear TRS for which NLV(l) ∩ Var(r) = ∅ for all l →
r ∈ R. Let A be a tree automaton. There exists t0 ∈ T (F ) such that t0 ∈ L(A, q)
and t0 →R t, if there exist a ground term t over F , a state q of A and a function τ
from Pos(t) to Q such that t ∈ L(Cγ(A), q), t < L(A, q) and τ satisfies the following
conditions: (i) τ(ε) = q; (ii) for all p ∈ Pos(t), t|p ∈ L(Cγ(A), τ(p)) and, (iii) for all
p ∈ Pos(t) \ {ε}, if τ(p) is a state of A, then t|p ∈ L(A, τ(p)).
Notice that the condition NLV(l)∩Var(r) = ∅ is a very strong condition that can be
easily weakened. However, this theoretical restriction can be practically relevant too,
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e.g. to model inverse operators. The example developed in Section 3.3 contains such a
rule: see (7).
P. To simplify the notations we denote by ∆1 the set of transitions of the automa-
ton Cγ(A), ∆0 the set of transitions of A, and Q0 the set of states of A.
The proof consists of 1) the construction of a term s1 ∈ T (F ,Q) such that
t →∗∆1 s1 →Normγ(l→r,σ,q) q, (14)
2) the construction, by iterating a backward process, of a term s ∈ T (F ,Q) such
that
t →∗∆1 s →
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q) q, and (15)
3) the proof that
t →∗∆0 rσ →
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q) q. (16)
First, using (ii) at the position ε gives t|ε →∗∆1 τ(ε). Since t = t|ε and since τ(ε) = q(by (i)), one has t →∗
∆1
q.
Since t ∈ T (F ) one has t , q, and every derivation t →∗
∆1
q has the length one, at
least. Consequently, there exists s1 ∈ T (F ,Q) such that t →∗∆1 s1 →∆1 q.
We now show by contradiction that the transition s1 → q < ∆0. Suppose that
s1 → q is a transition of ∆0. Then s1 ∈ T (F ,Q0). Thus, using (iii), t →∗∆0 s1 →∆0 q, a
contradiction ( t 6→∗
∆0
q).
Therefore, the transition s1 → q is in ∆1 \ ∆0. By definition of ∆1 (see Defini-
tion 3.5), there exist q′, σ : PosX(l)∗ 7→ Q and l → r ∈ R such that s1 →Cγ(A) q ∈
Normγ(l → r, σ, q′) and
lσ →∗∆0 q
′. (17)
Now by definitions of Normγ(l → r, σ, q′) and γ, each target state of a transition in
Normγ(l → r, σ, q′) is either Q \ Q0, or is equal to q′. Since s1 →Cγ(A) q ∈ Normγ(l →
r, σ, q′), either q ∈ Q \ Q0, or q = q′. Because q ∈ Q0, one has q = q′ and t →∗∆1
s1 →Normγ(l→r,σ,q) q.
We are done for (14). We now perform an iterative construction. If s1 < T (F ,Q0),
then there exists a position p of s1 such that s1(p) ∈ Q \ Q0. Thus s1(p) is of the form
s1(p) = γ(l → r, σ, q)(p). Since γ is injective, the only transition of ∆1 leading to s1(p)
is
r(p)(γ(l → r, σ, q)(p.1), . . . , γ(l → r, σ, q)(p.ℓ)) → s1(p).
Consequently, the derivation t →∗
∆1
s1 has to conclude by t →∗∆1 s2 → s1 where
s2 = s1[r(p)(γ(l → r, σ, q)(p.1), . . . , γ(l → r, σ, q)(p.ℓ))]p.
So, one has t →∗
∆1
s2 →Normγ(l→r,σ,q) s1 →Normγ(l→r,σ,q) q. Now, if s2 < T (F ,Q0),
the same construction can be iteratively applied to s2, and so on. Consequently, one
can build a term s ∈ T (F ,Q0) such that Pos(s) = Pos(r) and
t →∗∆1 s →
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q) q, (18)
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and for each position p of s such that s(p) < Q,
s(p) = r(p). (19)
We are done for (15) .
We can begin the last part of the proof. Let q1, . . . , qn be the states occurring in s
while reading s from the left to the right. Let p1, . . . , pn be respectively the positions
in s of states q1, . . . , qn. Notice that the backward construction of s is deterministic.
Indeed every derivation from t to q can be split up to
t →∗∆1 s →
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q) q.
It implies that for each qi, with i = 1, . . . , n, one has
qi = τ(pi). (20)
At this stage, s is of the form rσ since γ is defined for every position of r.
Now using (20) and the hypothesis iii), one has
t →∆0 rσ →
∗
Normγ(l→r,σ,q) q.
The TRS R being right-linear with NLV(l) ∩Var(r) = ∅ for each rule l → r of R,
one can built a substitution µ : PosX(l) 7→ T (F ) such that:
• For p ∈ PosVar(r)(l), one can set µ(p) = t′ and t′ = t|p′ with p′ ∈ Pos{l|p}(r).
Moreover, since l|p < NLV(l), one obtains µ(p) = t′ →∗∆0 σ(p).
• For p ∈ PosVar(l)\Var(r)(l), one can proceed in the following way:
– if l(p) ∈ NLV(l) then one can set µ(p′1), . . . , µ(p′1) to t′ where t′ ∈ L(A, σ(p′1))∩
... ∩ L(A, σ(p′n)) with {p′1, . . . , p′n} = Pos{l(p)}(l).
– Otherwise, one can set µ(p) to a term t′ ∈ L(A, σ(p)).
By this way, there exists t0 = lµ ∈ T (F ) such that t0 →∗A0 q and t0 →R t, proving
the lemma. 
The following result shows that each term of the language Cγ(A0) is reachable by
rewriting from A0 using R.
Theorem 3.2 Let A0 = (Q0,∆0, F0) be a finite tree automaton. Let R be a right-linear
TRS. Given the approximation function γ defined at the beginning of Section 3.4, if for
all l → r ∈ R, Var(r) ∩ NLV(l) = ∅ then L(Cγ(A0)) ⊆ R∗(L(A0)).
P. Let Pn be the following proposition:
For all t ∈ L(Cγ(A0)), if there exists a function τ from Pos(t) to Q such that τ(ε) = q f
and for all p ∈ Pos(t),
t|p →∗Cγ(A0) τ(p) and t[τ(p)]p →∗Cγ(A0) q f
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and such that |{p ∈ Pos(t) | τ(p) ∈ Q0 ∧ t|p 6→∗A0 τ(p)}| = n,
then t ∈ R∗(L(A0)).
We prove that Pn is true for all n ≥ 0 by induction on n. To simplify notations, let
NR(t, τ) = {p ∈ Pos(t) | τ(p) ∈ Q0 and t|p 6→∗A0 τ(p)}.
P0 : Assume that t and τ satisfy the hypothesis on P0. We have |NR(t, τ)| = 0. In
particular, ε < NR(t, τ). So, t = t|ε →A0 τ(ε) = q f . Since A0 and Cγ(A0) have
the same set of final states, t ∈ L(A0).
Pn =⇒ Pn+1: Assume that Pn is true for n ≥ 0 and that t and τ satisfy the hypothesis on Pn+1.
Since NR(t, τ) is non-empty, let p be a maximal element of NR(t, τ) (for the
lexicographical order). Then, by maximality of p, one can apply Lemma 3.3 to
t|p. Thus, there exists t0 ∈ T (F ) such that t0 →∗A0 τ(p) and t0 →R tp. Therefore,
there exists a function τ1 fromPos(t0) intoQ0 such that for all p′, t0 →∗A0 τ1(p′),
t[τ1(p′)]p′ →∗Cγ(A0) τ(p). We define the function τ2 from Pos(t[t0]p) to Q as
follows.
– If p is not a prefix of p′, then τ2(p′) = τ(p′),
– Otherwise, if p′ is of the form p.u, then τ2(p′) = τ1(u).
By construction, t[t0]p →R t and |NR(t[t0]p, τ2)| = n − 1. Thus, by induction,
t ∈ R∗(L(A0)).
It follows that Pn is true for all n ≥ 0, proving the theorem. 
Let C(n)γ (A0) be the tree automaton obtained after n completion steps performed
from A0 by using the TRS R and the approximation function γ. Finally, Proposition
3.1 shows that the approximation function γ provides a sound under-approximation of
reachable terms.
Proposition 3.1 If R is right-linear and for all l → r ∈ R, NLV(l) ∩ Var(r) = ∅
then for all n ≤ 0, L(C(n)γ (A0)) ⊆ R∗(L(A0)), L(C(n)γ (A0)) ⊆ L(C(n+1)γ (A0)) and⋃
n≥0 L(C(n)γ (A0)) = R∗(L(A0)).
P. By definition C(n+1)γ (A0) = gγ(C(n)γ (A0))). Consequently, the set of tran-
sitions of C(n)γ (A0) is included in the transition set of C(n+1)γ (A0). Thus L(C(n)γ (A0))
⊆ L(C(n+1)γ (A0)).
Now, using Lemma 3.2, one has for all n ≥ 1:
R(L(C(n)γ (A0))) ⊆ L(C(n+1)γ (A0)).
Consequently, by a direct induction, R≤n(L(A0)) ⊆ L(C(n+1)γ (A0)). It implies that
R∗(L(A0)) ⊆
⋃
n≥0
L(C(n)γ (A0)).
One can prove that for all n ∈ N, L(C(n)γ (A0)) ⊆ R∗(L(A0)) by direct induction on n
using Theorem 3.2, and we are done. 
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3.5 Practical Issues
3.5.1 Approximations for Ensuring Safety
Thanks to the above theoretical contributions, at this point, we have means to compute
over-approximations and under-approximations of reachable terms. From a system
verification point of view, by representing the set of initial configurations of a given
system by a tree automatonA0, and by encoding its evolution by a TRS R, R∗(L(A0))
stands for the set of actually reachable configurations. Given a set of bad configurations
encoded by a tree automaton ABad, in order to verify a safety property, it is enough
to decide whether the intersection between R∗(L(A0)) and L(Abad) is empty. So,
as shown in Fig. 1, under-approximations are useful to show that there is one bad
configuration reachable, at least. And computing over-approximations is useful to show
that no bad configuration is reachable.
0
L(A   )
bad
R*(L(A  ))0
γ
R*
...
: approximation function
L(A  ) 0 L(A   )bad
0R*(L(A  ))
γ
R*
: approximation function
L(A  )
Figure 1: System verification using approximations.
3.5.2 Application to Protocols with Algebraic Properties
The completion procedure in Sect. 3.2 fits with all non left-linear TRSs. However, the
user may be interested in developing algorithms to efficiently handle the completion for
a particular class of non-linear rewrite rules. In the security protocol analysis frame-
work, the problematic non left-linear rules usually concern the decoding abilities of an
intruder and the algebraic properties of some cryptographic primitives. A particularity
of such rules is that they are quadratic, i.e. , rules where a variable can occur at most
twice within the left-hand side of the rule; let mention x ⊕ x → 0 for example. For this
application field, this section gives an algorithm to efficiently handle the completion
on TRSs with quadratic rules, called quadratic completion. This algorithm is then used
for the experiments described in Section 4.1.
Recall that each completion step requires the computation of (l → r)-substitu-
tions compatible with the current tree automaton. In Example 3.2, the rule in Rexe
is quadratic, and the substitution σexe is Aexe-compatible because L(Aexe, σexe(1)) ∩
L(A, σexe(2.2)) , ∅. This last computation can be done thanks to the square of Aexe
by establishing the non emptiness of L(Aexe ×Aexe, 〈σexe(1), σexe(2.2)〉).
Definition 3.6 Let A = (Q,∆, F) be a tree automaton. The square of A, denoted A2,
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∆0
∆0
∆1 \∆0
∆1 \∆0
∆0 ×∆0
already omputed
in the
previous step
∆1 \∆0
×
∆0
∆0
×
∆1 \∆0
∆1 \∆0
×
∆1 \∆0
is the automaton = (Q × Q,∆′, F × F〉 where:
∆′ = { f (〈q1,q′1〉, . . . , 〈qn, q′n〉) → 〈q, q′〉 |
f (q1, . . . , qn) → q ∈ ∆ ∧ f (q′1, . . . , q′n) → q′ ∈ ∆}.
Roughly speaking, for TRSs specifying protocols with quadratic rules, the square
of a tree automaton – the product of a tree automaton with itself – can be computed by
using the square of its predecessor. Computing the square of an automaton allows us
to know whether there is a common datum between two states q and q′ of the built au-
tomaton. The quadratic rules are then linearised, and the values taken by the linearised
variables are checked on-the-fly. For example, if variable x occurs twice in a rule, one
of occurrences is replaced by a fresh variable y in this rule the left-hand side. Then,
this rule can be fired if the states q and q′ – taken as values by resp. x and y – share at
least a term.
More formally, let A = (Q,∆, F) be a tree automaton. Let A2 = (QA2 ,∆A2 , FA2)
be the square of the current tree automaton A according to Def. 3.6. The square of the
tree automaton Cγ(A) can be computed in the following way: (Cγ(A))2 = (QA2 ∪ (Q×
(Q′ \ Q)) ∪ ((Q′ \ Q) × Q) ∪ ((Q′ \ Q) × (Q′ \ Q)),∆A2 ∪ (∆ × (∆′ \ ∆)) ∪ ((∆′ \ ∆) × ∆)
∪((∆′ \∆)× (∆′ \∆)), FA2). Note that the square of Cγ(A) is based on the square of A.
To decide the firing of a rule, an efficient state-of-the-art algorithm for the emptiness
decision (see [CDG+02] for example) and an adapted data structure updated on-the-fly
are used. Doing so, one can decide in a very efficient way whether the language of the
squared automaton recognised by {(q, q′)} is not empty. In that case, the rule is fired
with the computed substitution.
Thanks to these new features, a large number of protocols has been successfully
validated: NSPK-xor, View-only, and also the Encrypted Key Exchange protocol
(EKE2) using the exponential operator. All of these improvements are carried out in the
next section.
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4 Automatic Approximations and Applications for Ver-
ifying Cryptographic Protocols
Modelling security protocols by tree automata and term rewriting systems is basic,
see[GK00] for instance. On the one hand, the initial knowledge and synthesis abilities
of the intruder are encoded by a tree automatonA0. On the other hand, a term rewriting
system R encodes protocol steps and intruder’s analysis abilities. Our main purpose
being to automate the protocol analysis in so far as possible, approximations should be
generated automatically. The main ideas behind such a fully automatic generation are
given in Section 4.1. We then give in Section 4.2 new experimental results obtained
with the new version of the TA4SPtool.
4.1 Automatic Generation of Approximations
Notice that a safe and sound abstraction with only two agents [CLC03] is considered.
For each rule l → r, each (l → r)-substitution σ, each state q and each position p
one has to define γ(l → r, σ, q)(p). Note that the approximation function is build in
order to use finitely many nonces (number used once).
NextR is divided into two parts: R1 that encodes protocol steps andR2 that encodes
intruder’s abilities. For rules in R2, γ(l → r, σ, q)(p) is independent of both σ and q.
Moreover, for every pair of rules l1 → r1 and l2 → r2 and positions of p1 of r1 and p2
of r2, one has γ(l1 → r1)(p1) , γ(l2 → r2)(p2).
For rules in R1, γ(l → r, σ, q)(p) does not depend on q but only on l → r, p and
the value of σ on a finite set of variables {x1, . . . xn}, representing agents names. The
intuition is that one can ensure (by automaton properties) that if lσ →∗
A
q then σ(xi)
may have a bounded number of values. Furthermore, the injectiveness like for R2 rules
is required.
Since there are finitely many rules with finitely many positions, the number of
states introduced during completion steps is bounded. Consequently, the completion
procedure always stops with that approximation function and then computes an over-
approximation. Concerning the under-approximations, roughly speaking new states
are introduced each time it is necessary. We refer the interested reader to [BHK05] for
more details.
4.2 Experimental Results
This section reports on new experimental results obtained when using the new version
of the TA4SP tool 1.
The fully automatic TA4SP [BHK05] tool has been plugged into the high level pro-
tocol specification language HLPSL. We have thoroughly assessed the TA4SP tool by
running it against some IETF2 protocols of the AVISPA Library3 and others from the
1http://www.loria.fr/~boichut/ta4sp.html.
2Internet Engineering Task Force
3Available at http://www.avispa-project.org/.
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Protocol Computation time(s) Diagnostic
(seconds)
NSPKL 4.12 SAFE
NSPK 10.26 RMU
NSSK 266.88 SAFE
NSPK-XOR 1803.97 RMU
Denning-Sacco sh. key 24.98 SAFE
Yahalom 874.35 SAFE
Andrew Secure RPC 212.01 SAFE
Wide Mouthed Frog 30.45 SAFE
Kaochow v1 227.30 SAFE
Kaochow v2 153.00 SAFE
TMN 109.08 RMU
AAA Mobile IP 1115.00 SAFE
UMTS-AKA 2.55 SAFE
CHAPv2 18.69 SAFE
CRAM-MD5 1.14 SAFE
DHCP-Delayed-Auth 1.05 SAFE
EKE 11.76 SAFE
EKE2 1541.43 SAFE
LPD-IMSR 12.24 SAFE
LPD-MSR 6.52 RMU
h.530-fix 54687.67 ??
TSIG 1140.38 SAFE
SHARE 50.41 SAFE
View-only-untyped 18444.57 SAFE
Figure 2: Experiments on some secrecy properties using TA4SP
Clark and Jacob library [CJ97]. The experimental results are reported in Fig. 4.2, be-
low. The diagnostic SAFE means that all secrecy properties have been verified for an
unbounded number of executions of the initial HLPSL scenario. A contrario, the diag-
nostic RMU – Rewriting Model is Unsafe – relates that there exists an attack against
one of the secrecy properties in our unbounded rewriting model. The diagnostic ??
means that no conclusion can be drawn.
Using implemented under-approximations presented in Sect. 3.4, four protocols
(NSPK, NSPK-XOR, TMN and LPD-MSR) given in Fig. 4.2 have been diagnosed as flawed
and the attack traces have, indeed, been built with other tools of the AVISPA plat-
form. Nineteen protocols, specified in HLPSL, have been shown secure using over-
approximations as in Sect. 4.1. Notice that we have successfully applied TA4SP not
only to well-known protocols like NSPKL, SHARE, LPD-IMSR, from the Clark and Jacob
library, but also to large-scale IETF protocols as DHCP-Delayed -Auth, CRAM-MD5,
CHAPv2, TSIG, AAA Mobile IP, etc.
The protocols EKE2, h.530-fix and View-only-untyped use cryptographic op-
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erators with algebraic properties: exp and xor. The protocols View-only- untyped
and EKE2 have been successfully analysed despite the computation time for the latter.
Not so good computation time is better than an inconclusive result, as for h.530-fix.
Note that the on-the-fly computation (OFC) in Sect. 3.5.2 has allowed us to check the
protocol View-only-untypedwhen a naive approach was result-less as shown below.
Completion step 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
OFC Time (in s) 0.41 0.59 0.97 2.84 4.55 25 1709 7343 8956
Time (in s) 0.25 0.33 0.79 1.67 6.02 73.60 49.55 >18000 ×
Completion step 9 10 Total
OFC Time (in s) 363.12 36.38 18444.57
Time (in s) × × ×
Before concluding this section, let us focus on the interesting but inconclusive re-
sult concerning the protocol h.530-fix. In [BMV03], the authors have detected an
unknown attack against the protocol h.530 using OFMC (On-the-Fly Model-Checker).
They have then proposed a new version of this protocol: h.530-fix. OFMC has
shown this protocol secure for the given scenario. So it is quite challenging to show
that this protocol is indeed secure now for an unbounded number of sessions. We have
tried to check the new version but, its analysis leads to an inconclusive result. How-
ever, it would be interesting to define finer approximations in order to show the safety
of this protocol. We plan also to investigate in this direction – notably using a trace
reconstruction technique we have developed in [BG06].
One last word about the computation times of Fig. 4.2: they are indeed not as good
as we wished, but we are developing a promising new engine for the completion which
gives impressive results. For example, a computation taking four days long has been
reduced to forty-five minutes. This rewrite engine is still in progress, but we hope to
integrate the next engine within TA4SP in the coming months.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents an essential improvement of [FGVTT04] showing how to extend
that work to any kind of TRSs. Moreover, we also explained how to automate this
approach in a suitable way. In this context we have provided a new tree regular model-
checking technique. We also exposed how to use the technique for analysing security
protocols, showing that the approach is not a purely domain-theoretic framework. We
want to emphasise the fact that all the algorithms have been implemented, giving rise
to the new version of the TA4SP tool.
The construction presented in this paper has several interesting features. The au-
tomatic generation of approximation functions for security protocols is quite intuitive.
Indeed, it can be summarised to the following intuition: "for such a session, normalise
in such a way". But, one can wonder how to generate approximations automatically
for more complex objects, as Java programs [BGJLR07]. It would also be interesting
to investigate similar approaches for unranked-tree automata that are useful for XML
documents analysis. Moreover, a central question arising out of our work is how to
combine the approximation-based techniques with existing tree automata regular tech-
niques approaches, in order to get benefit from both approaches.
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